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The R&D Factor in International Trade and
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William Gruber, Dileep Mehta, and Raymond Vernon
ABSTRACT
Analyzes international trade, international investment, and sales of
foreign U.S. manufacturing subsidiaries in order to determine the relation-
ship between the intensity of R & D effort and the international activity.
Those industries with higher levels of research intensity are found to be
the industries with more favorable performance in international trade and
higher levels of foreign investment and sales of foreign manufacturing
facilities. R&D intensive industries were also found to be more
concentrated, of larger scale of operations, and subject to higher proportions
of fixed to total costs. The reasons for the link between R&D intensity
and international activity are explored and some tentative answers are
suggested.

The R&D Factor in International Trade and
International Investment of United States Industries
by
William Gruber, Dileep Mehta, and Raymond Vernon*
In the last ten or fifteen years, the field of inter-
national trade theory has been in continuous ferment. The
received doctrine drawn from the mainstream of Smith-Ricardo-
Mill-Marshall-Heckscher-Ohlin has been re-examined from many
different angles. Sometimes, there have been strongly
revisionist reactions, such as those encountered in the eco-
2
nomic development area. In other contexts, the emphasis has
Gruber 's contribution to this work was financed by a grant from
the MIT Center for Space Research funded by NASA, while the
work of Mehta and Vernon was financed by a grant from the Ford
Foundation to the Harvard Business School. Calculations were
done at the MIT Computation Center.
For authoritative summaries, see: John Chipman, "A Sur-
vey of the Theory of International Trade, " Econometrica , Vol.
33, July 1965, pp. 477 to 519 and Vol. 33, October 1965, pp.
685 to 760; also J. Bhagwati, "The Pure Theory of International
Trade: A Survey," The Economic Journal , Vol. LXXIV, No. 293,
March 1964, pp. 1-84.
2This school is epitomized by the writings of Economic
Commission for Latin America. See Werner Baer, "The Economics
of Prebisch and ECLA" in Economic Development and Cultural
Change , Vol. X, No. 2, Pt. 1, January 1962, pp. 169-82.
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been mainly on the further testing and refinement of the doc-
trine of comparative advantage and the role of factor endow-
ments.
Much of the discussion of United States trade performance
in recent years has taken for granted the main premises of
classical and neo-classical theory. A considerable part of the
debate over the interpretation of the Leontief paradox and
much of the discussion of the implications of other recent
empirical work have concentrated on questions of national
factor endowments, or the response of national production func-
tions to different factor prices^ or other issues readily compa-
tible with the classical theoretical structure. Leontief,
for instance, was inclined to "explain" his familiar paradox
by asserting that skilled labor may be relatively cheap in
the United States economy.
Nonetheless, one can also detect an echo of the discontent
voiced so effectively by Williams in 1929, a discontent based
on the view that classical doctrine is not structured to deal
efficiently with the trade implications of a number of forces
that may be of major consequence in any descriptive and analyti-
4
cal work. For the most part, the literature of dissent seems
J.H. Williams, "The Theory of International Trade Re-
considered," The Economic Journal , June 1929, Vol. XXXIX,
pp. 195-209.
4See Erik Hoffmeyer, Dollar-Shortage (Amsterdam; North
Holland Publishing Co., 1958); G.O.A. MacDougall, The World
Dollar Problem (London: Macmillian & Co., 1958); S.B. Linder,
An Essay in Trade and Transformation (Uppsala; Almqvist and
Wicksells, 1961); C.P. Kindleberger, Foreign Trade and the
National Economy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).
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to have sprung out of efforts to explain the foreign trade
patterns of the United States, especially the country's ex-
ports of manufactured goods o United States labor „ it has been
observed, is higher-priced than labor abroad, to an extent
which greatly exceeds any productivity differences „ To be
sure, United States capital is cheaper and less tightly
rationed. But the effective interest rate for major indus-
trial borrowers only differ by a few percentage points among
the advanced countries. This difference hardly seems enough
to explain the strength and persistence of United States ex-
ports in manufactured products.
From capital and labor cost considerations, therefore,
attention has turned to questions of innovation, of scale, of
leads and lags. Approaches of this sort have tended to
Mordechai Kreinin, "The Leontief Scarce-Factor Paradox,
"
The American Economic Review^ Vol, LV, No^ 1, March 1965,
pp. 131-139.
See M.V. Posner, "International Trade and Technical
Change," Oxford Economic Papers , Vol. 13, No. 3, October
1961, pp. 323-341? C Freeman. "The Plastics Industry s A
Comparative Study of Research and Innovation^, " National In-
stitute Economic Review , No. 26, NoVo 1963, pp. 22-62? C.
Freeman, "Research and Development in Electronic Capital
Goods," National Institute Economic Review , No. 34, Nov. 1965,
pp. 40-91; G.C. Hufbauer, Synthetic Materials and the Theory
of International Trade (London; Gerald Duckworth & Co,
,
1965) ; Seev Hirsch, Location of Industry and International
Competitiveness
, an unpublished doctoral thesis at the
Harvard Business School, 1965, shortly to be published by the
Oxford University Press; and L.T. Wells, Product Innovation
and Directions of International Trade , an unpublished doc-
toral thesis at the Harvard Business School, 1966.
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stress the possibility that the United States may base its
strength in the export of manufactured goods upon monopoly
advantages, stemming in the first instance out of a strong
propensity to develop new products or new cost-saving proces-
ses. This propensity has usually been credited either to the
demand conditions that confront the American entrepreneur or
to the scale and structure of enterprise in United States
markets. In any case, the propensity has given American pro-
ducers a temporary advantage which has been protected for a
time either by patents or by secrecy. Eventually the monopoly
advantage has been eroded; but by that time, the United
States producers have seized the advantage in other products.
Of late, the tendency has been to search for hypotheses
which "explain" not only the apparent strength in United
States exports of manufactured products but also the apparent
propensity of United States producers of those very products
7
to set up manufacturing facilities abroad. This line of
speculation takes off from the observation that entrepreneurs
in the United States are surrounded by a structure of domes-
tic demand for producer and consumer goods that is in some
respects a forerunner of what will later be found in other
7 See, e.g., Judd Polk, I.W. Meister, and C.A, Veit,
U.S. Production Abroad and the Balance of Payments (New York:
National Industrial Conference Board, 1966) ; also Raymond
Vernon, "International Trade and International Investment in
the Product Cycle, " Quarterly Journal of Economics , May
1966.
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countries. Labor is costly in relation to its productivity,
while capital is comparatively plentiful, facts which influence
the nature of the demand for producer goods. And per capita
incomes are high by international standards, a fact which
creates unique consumption patterns „ This means that entre-
preneurs in the United States are likely to be wixiing to
gamble on the innovation of labor-saving and affluent-consu-
mer products at an earlier point in time than their overseas
competitors.
The hypotheses go on to project certain characteristic
sequences in the foreign trade of products that have been in-
novated in the United States. According to the assumption,
although the new products that satisfy high-income or labor-
substituting wants may have their earliest and largest mar-
kets in the United States, some demand for them is generally
assumed to exist elsewhere. And in the course of time, that
demand will normally grow. For a time,, then^ the United
States will have an oligopoly position in supplying foreign
markets. And this oligopoly position will be strongest
with respect to the products of those United States indus-
tries which have been making the largest research and de-
velopment effort.
According to hypotheses of this genre, overseas invest-
ment eventually comes into the picture partly because

6.
the large-scale marketing of technically sophisticated products
demancfe the existence of local facilities and partly because
the protection of the oligopoly position of the United States
producer eventually requires such investment. The threat of
competition in foreign markets may come from local sources
or from other outside producers, as the original technology-
based oligopoly position of the United States producer in
any given product begins to be eroded. At this point, with
profits on exports being threatened, the United States company
may see a high prospective marginal yield in an investment
in local facilities, provided such facilities will help to
buttress its existing market position.
A chain of hypotheses as complex as these needs exten-
sive testing before it can gain much in credibility. This
brief paper is much less than an adequate test of the chain.
But it does contribute modestly to the credibility of the chain
for some industries. At the same time, however, the data
suggest that simple univariate explanations of the complex
causal chain may be dangerous? that while the relevant
explanations may involve "research" or "technology" or simi-
lar factors in one form or another, the causal role played
by such factors may well be rather different from one industry
to another.

7.
Q
Research and Trade
All roads lead to a link between export performance and
R&D. Whether one accepts the cheap-skilled-labor hypothe-
sis of Leontief or the oligopoly hypotheses in the tradition
of Williams, one expects to see a link between exports and
research effort. Table 1 provides a simple set of data typi-
cal of the evidence which relates research effort by U.S.
industry to United States trade performance in 1962. The
positive correlation between the "research effort" measures,
R, and R- , and the "export performance" measures, E, and E_
,
is evident to the eye. The five industries with the great-
est "research effort" are also the five industries with the
9
most favorable trade position. When the five industries
with the highest research effort are separated off from the
Q
Attempts to quantify the relationship between research
and trade have begun to appear in the literature. The French
have coined the term "technological balance of payments"
and some quantitative measures of this concept are presented
in C. Freeman and A. Young, The Research and Development
Effort in Western Europe, North America and the Soviet Union
(Paris: OECD, 1965), pp. 51-55, 74. The relationship between
the employment of scientists and engineers and trade position
has been tested by Donald B. Keesing (see his "Labor Skills
and Comparative Advantage, " in Proceedings of the 78th Annual
Meeting, December, 1965, American Economic Review , Vol. 2,
May, 1966). Keesing' s findings in that paper and in some un-
published work parallel and agree with some of the findings
in the first section of this paper.
9The Spearman rank coefficient for the association be-
tween R, and E, , as those terms are defined in Table 1, is
+0.69; between R. and E^. is +0.79; between R- and E,, +0.74;
and between R_ and E-, , +0.69o All coefficients are significant
at the one percent level. Pearson least squares coefficients
give similar results. In these correlation measures and in
others presented hereafter, 22 sets of paired observations,
rather than 19, are used, since each of the 3 digit indus-
tires shown in Tables 1 and 2 provides the basis for a
separate observation.
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other 14 industries, it begins to grow clear that the export
strength of United States industries is centered in the group
of fiLve; in fact, the 14 remaining industries exhibit a net im-
port rather than a net export balance for the year 1962.
In speaking of export strength, however, one has to ex-
hibit a certain caution. The phrase may have many different
meanings, and a word or two about the measures contained in
Table 1 will be helpful to clarify some of the concepts involved.
Measure E, , a ratio of exports to total sales in each
industry, can hardly be thought of as a measure of United
States comparative advantage for the industry. Such a
measure, after all, is not only a function of the competi-
tive position of United States industry; it also reflects,
inter alia , the structure of demand overseas as compared with
the United States, as well as the effects of transport and
tariff frictions on international trade.
Measure E-—namely, the excess of exports over imports
taken as a percentage of sales—-goes a little way in the di-
rection of allowing for the effects of demand differences and
trading frictions. We observed earlier that differences in
demand, rather than in competitive position, might account
for a low level of United States exports at an earlier stage
in a product's development; but there is a respectable
body of opinion for the view that in products for which U.S.
demand differs greatly from demand in foreign markets, the

11.
risk of heavy imports from abroad is not very great. Wliere
demand differences were holding down exports, therefore, they
might also be expected to hold down imports. The same is true
of transport frictions; if these were responsible for a poor
export showing, it would not be utterly unreasonable to sup-
pose that the same forces might be discouraging imports.
It is slightly reassuring to observe, therefore, that both
measures of export performance act in a remarkably parallel
fashion, generally reflecting a strong export position for
research-oriented industries and a weak export position for
industries without large research inputs. To be sure, the
parallelism cannot be said to prove too much; the so-called
correction provided by the second measure need not wipe out
all biases of the sort mentioned earlier, if they exist.
But we propose to show, as the analysis progresses, that the
simple ratio of exports to sales is not wholly misleading as a
measure of international competitive strength.
There is still another kind of problem which data of
the sort presented in Table 1 may well involve. Each unit
of observation in Table 1 is an "industry," arbitrarily de-
fined. Each such "industry" can be proliferated into two
or more, by schism. Has the arbitrary grouping used in
Table 1 provided an impression of the export importance of
Characteristic of this view is the case made in
S.B. Linder, op. cit .

12.
the research-oriented industries which distorts the absolute
contribution of these industries to the United States
economy? The data in Table 2 lay that fear to rest. The
figures show that the five industries with the strongest re-
search effort accounted for 72.0 per cent of the nation's ex-
ports of manufactured goods though they were responsible for
only 39.1 per cent of the nation's total sales of such goods.
The same five industries were also responsible for 89.4 per cent
of the nation's total R&D expenditures, and 74=6 per cent
of the company financed R&D expenditures. The five in-
dustries concerned, therefore, represent both the heart of
United States export strength in manufactured products and
the heart of its indi-strial research effort.
In groping for some credible measure of comparative ad-
vantage, however, it is not necessary to stop with the
measures presented in Tables 1 and 2. Still another set of
measures can be devised which relate United States industry
export performance to the export performance of the same
industry localized in prospective competitor countries. In
this case, the "normalizing" variable becomes the total
industry exports of all the countries concerned, rather than
the total shipments of United States industry. Neither
normalizer is wholly without latent error as a measure of
comparative advantage. But the use of another approach offers
an opportunity to expose any lurking anomalies and to generate
more information about the underlying forces.
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The results of the new approach are presented in Table
3. In general the figures in the table tend to add a little
more credence to the view that the export performance measures
used in earlier tables are a function of the international
competitive strength of the United States industries they
represent.
The extreme left-hand column of Spearman coefficients in
Table 3 presents measures of correlation between (1) the indi-
cated measures of each United States industry's research ef-
fort and (2) United States exports in each industry taken as
a percentage of the exports of the OECD countries in the
industry. The resulting relationships are parafctiCkllyndhdds-
tinguishable from the rank correlations between R&D and
export performance done for the data in Table 1,
In the next two columns of Table 3, however, almost all
these relationships fall apart. In these columns, United
States exports to the world are "normalized" by calculating
them respectively as a ratio to United Kingdom world exports
and to German world exports. The result is that, suddenly,
almost all the statistically significant relationships dis-
appear. What this means, of course, is that the United
Kingdom and the German export profiles must be very much like
that of the United States. Wherever the United States has a
large volume of exports, the United Kingdom and Germany also
have a large volume of exports.
The ratio of U.S. exports to the sum of the exports of
a group of nations has been called "trade competitive power"
by Donald Keesing. He found that there was a rank correlation
of +0.60 between "trade competitive power" and of scientists
and engineers as a percentage of total employment for a sample
of 35 non-natural-resource processing industries (Keesing,
op. cit . , p. 256)
.
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Table 3
World Exports of U.S. Industries
Related to the World Exports of
OECD Countries in 1962
Spearman coefficient of rank correlation for indicated cell
Industry
characteristics
U.S. world exports in 1962 as a percent of
world exports of
OECD United West
countries Kingdom Germany France
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total R&D ex-
penditures as a
% of sales in
1962 +0.68 +0.28^ +0.08^ +0.60
Scientists and
engineers in
R & D as a % of
total employment
in 1962 +0.64 +0.37 +0.24* + 0.59
Although Japan did not join the OECD until after 1962
Japan is included in the data.
These coefficients are not significant at the 5 per cent
probability level. All other coefficients in the table are
significant at that level or at a lower probability level.
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Does this mean that all our prior indications of the
causes of United States export strength were misleading?
Not at all. It means rather that the United Kingdom and
Germany, also being at the top of the advanced country list
with relatively high incomes and a relatively heavy stress
on industrial innovation and product development, derive their
export strength from roughly the same characteris :.cs as
those that govern United States export performance. Their
export performance differs from that of the other OECD
countries in the same general way that United States export
performance differs from that of the OECD countries.
The extreme right-hand column of Table 3 offers some
parallel data for United States exports in relation to those
of France. These data are more tantalizing than they are re-
vealing. Wien French exports to the world are used as the
normalizer, as the table shows, the significant correlations
return; French exports evidently have a profile much more
nearly corresponding to the less developed of the OECD
countries than to those of the United Kingdom and Germany.
The common view of French industry does paint a picture
of an institution that is different in structure, in outlook,
and in innovational habits than the industry of the United
States, the United Kingdom and Germany. Table 4 indicates that
French industrial research is not on a smaller scale, real-
tively speaking, than that of Germany. The research tends to
be controlled, however, to a greater degree by government

18,
Table 4
Characteristics of R & D Activity
in United States, United Kingdom, West
Germany, and France, 1962
United United West
States Kingdom Germany France
Number of scientists and
engineers in R & D ('OOO's
full-time equivalents) 435.6 50.7 40.1 28.0
R&D personnel as a %
of working population 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.4
R&D expenditure
(billions of U.S. dollars) 17.5 1,8 1.1 1.1
R & D as a % of GNP 3.1 2.2 1.3 1.5
R&D expenditures performed
in the business section as a
% of total national R&D
expenditures 71 63 61 48
^No adjustment was made for differences in relative
factor prices.
Source: C. Freeman and A. Young, The Research and De -
velopment Effort in Western Europe, North
America and the Soviet Union (Paris: OECD,
1965) pp. 71-72.
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inatitutiona which are said to have less concern with indus-
trial applications. Furthermore, French industry's ingenuity,
as illustrated by the automobile producers, is said to be de-
voted to highly differentiated, highly individual tastes. Up
to a point, such innovation might have the same export pos-
sibilities as the differentiated products of the United States,
the United Kingdom and Germany. Pushed very far, however,
stress on this kind of output has the effect of encouraging
an industrial structure which is not highly concentrated,
hence a structure which reflects few scale economies in
either production or (more importantly, in this context)
in research servicing or in sales. The sale of products for
the overseas markets, especially products that have high
technical inputs, cannot easily be achieved by an industry of
small firms whose innovational stress borders on artistry.
The United States model of the highly concentrated mass in-
novator seems more closely to approximate the effective pat-
tern for the successful exporter.
We now come to another group of measures, slightly dif-
ferent in approach, which appear to offer some added evidence
of the sources of United States export strength. In Tables
1, 2, and 3, it should be remembered, we were concerned with
analyzing and comparing the world exports of each United
States industry expressing those exports by various relative
measures. Table 5 disaggregates the data into U.S. trade
with Europe and U.S. trade with non-Europe. It will be ob-
served that in every case there is a better relationship
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between research intensity and trade with Europe. In fact,
the relationship between (1) R & D as a per cent of sales
and (2) trade advantage as measured by the excess of exports
over imports as a per cent of sales does not exist at a sig-
nificant level.
The United States margin of competitive strength in the
research intensive industries is challenged by Europe, there-
fore, more effectively than by other countries. This is al-
most self-evident and has already been suggested by the data
on the United Kingdom and German trade patterns. We pro-
pose shortly to show that part of the result was due, beyond
much doubt, to the patterns of United States industry's in-
vestments in overseas productive facilities. But before we
turn to that phase of the analysis, it will be useful to
pin down more firmly what is meant by the research-intensive
industries.
Characteristics of Research-Intensive Industries
So far the presentation has referred to research-inten-
sive and research-oriented industries, as if a research
orientation was synonymous with a new product orientation,
as if the new product orientation was the most likely
characteristic of those industries to be linked with their
export strength. However, a number of different industry
characteristics are related to research effort, and some of
these characteristics may provide equally plausible explana-
tions of export performance. This proves to be an especially

22.
important point because of the message projected by the data
in Table 6.
That table begins by reassuring us in one respect. It
indicates that the industries with the strongest research ef-
fort are also those with the strongest new-product orientation.
But the table goes on to demonstrate that a high research
and development effort in an industry is closely correlated
with various other characteristics. The table demonstrates
that industries with a heavy complement of scientists and
engineers in research and development also have a heavy
complement of scientists and engineers in production, as
well as in sales. To a considerable extent, therefore, high
technical effort at any stage of the design-production-
marketing process is associated with high technical effort
at all the other stages.
The measures in Table 5 tell us more, however. They
indicate that the intensity of the research and development
effort is greatest in industries in which the degree of em-
ployment concentration is high, and in industries in which
large firms are particularly dominant.
12
So far, the statistical picture is familiar enough.
12Compare, for instance, the findings in J.S. Worley,
"The Changing Direction of Research and Development Employ-
ment among Firms, " in Universities-National Bureau Com-
mittee for Economic Research, The Rate and Direction of
Inventive Activity (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1962) pp. 233-251).

23.
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Where the statistics begin to break some new ground is in
their indication that the large"Scale high-concentration pat-
tern is not associated with high capital intensityo To be
sure, high indirect labor costs are positively correlated
with high research effort? and high indirect labor costs
could well be consistent with high capital inten. ty. But
the picture of high capital intensity is virtually dispel-
led by the two final measures in Table 3„ Here, two fairly
sensitive measures of capital intensity fail to display any
13
systematic relation with high research effort.
These findings » when drawn together, paint a fairly
consistent picture^ They suggest the existence of national
markets in which economies of large scale and barriers to
entry stem from the requirements of successful product in-
novation and successful marketing, rather than from capital
14intensity. The forces that determine the propensity to
gamble on product innovation are no doubt extraordinarily
complex, and lend themselves only grudgingly to easy
This result is consistent with analyses done by George
E. Delehanty, in which he finds that the ratio of nonpro-
duction employment to production employment in United
States industries is more closely correlated with the degree
to which scientists and engineers are in the work force of
the industry than with the capital : labor ratio of the in-
dustry. See Delehanty, "An Analysis of the Changing Propor-
tion of Nonproduction Workers in U.S. Manufacturing Indus-
tries," unpublished doctoral thesis at M.I.T., 1962.
14This, of course, is hardly a new thought; see Joe S.
Bain Barriers to New Competition (Cambridge s Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1956) See also C- Freeman s observations about
the "reasons for the United States lead" in electronics, in
his "Research and Development in Electronic Capital Goods,"
cited earlier, p 51,

27.
generalization. A firm that can spread its research risks
over a large number of efforts will have a more predictable
pay-out in any finite period than one wliich does not have the
resources for a large number of tries, especially if the an-
ticipated yield on any single effort is not systematically
different for large firms than for small.
Once the new product has been invented, scale continues
to play a part in success. The sale of technically complex
producer goods, for instance, requires a detailed under-
standing of the needs of customers, a continuing sales ser-
vice, readily accessible spare parts, and a high level of
research activity to keep the product competitive. The act
of exporting to foreign markets, therefore, represents a
marketing investment which one would expect to be associated
with significant scale economies.
In sum, one derives a picture of high research effort
being correlated with industries that experience substantial
trade surpluses. These research-intensive industries, al-
though large and concentrated, are not systematically capi-
tal-intensive. It is in these industries that the United
States trade advantage lies.

^ 28.
Trade and Investment in Foreign Manufacturing Subsidiaries
Neither the theory of international trade nor the theory
of international capital movements has much to offer in ex-
planation of managerial decisions to invest in production
facilities abroad. International trade is explained largely
in comparative advantage and factor endowment terms; long-
term capital movements are seen largely as a reflection of
the process of equating the marginal efficiency of capital
in different countries. Yet intuitively one is aware that
the prospective foreign investor, debating whether to invest
in a production facility in a foreign market, is engaged in
an evaluation process which juggles a number of additional
major variables.
One way of looking at the overseas direct investments
of United States producers of manufactures is that they are
the final step in a process which begins with the involve-
ment of such producers in export trade. The export trade
of the United States, according to the data presented earlier,
is heavily weighted with products that demand large scien-
tific and technical inputs in the selling process. Products
of this sort, as we noted earlier, ordinarily demand an ap-
paratus for learning customer needs and for subsequent tech-
nical servicing and consulting. Once such an organization
has been established for sales purposes, the marginal costs
of setting up a facility for production may be sharply re-
duced; for "marginal cost" in this context sliouid be x-.'.bO
not solely as a direct money expenditure but also as a measure
of the pain of acquiring information regarding a country,
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negotiating for entry in a foreign economy, altering the
company's organization to accommodate the new element, and
tolerating the high subjective risks involved in a novel
venture. Once the marginal costs are reduced in this sense,
the probability that the venture may appear economical is of
course enhanced. Whence it follows that industr. s with com-
paratively high export sales of products involving scientific
and technical aspects in their sales and servicing, ceteris
paribus , will have a high propensity to invest in manufac-
turing subsidiaries in the markets they serve.
This hypothesis appears particularly plausible if ad-
ditional factors are considered. The research-intensive
industries tend to be highly concentrated, and suggest the
existence of strong oligopoly forces. It is in such
industries that rule-of-thumb measures of success such as
"maintaining our share of world markets" can be expected to
enter most strongly into the investment decisions. In in-
dustries with lower concentration characteristics, the in-
dividual firm presumably finds share stability a less re-
liable gauge of its long-run survival or profit-maximizing
prospects than in industries in which the principal rivals
are few in number. In the oligopoly industries, therefore,
individual firms are likely to consider foreign investments
as important forestalling tactics to cut off market pre-
emption by others. And they are likely to feel obliged to
counter an investment by others with an investment of their
own.
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The available figures on foreign direct investment by
United States enterprise do nothing to undermine the credi-
bility of these hypotheses. The figures in Table 7 indicate
in various ways that the propensity for United States in-
dustry to build facilities or otherwise to invest abroad, when
"normalized" by the United States investment lev^ , is higher
in the research-oriented industries than in other industries.
The figures on sales by U.S. subsidiaries abroad exhibit the
same general characteristics as those for investment; when
"normalized" by sales in the United States, sales of United
States subsidiaries abroad are weighted heavily in favor of
the research-oriented groups. The figures in the table have
to be interpreted with a certain caution since investments
in the non-Europe areas are heavily weighted with resource-
oriented activities, such as paper and food processing.
But the very limited conclusion suggested above obviously
holds.
The figures in Table 8 permit slightly deeper probing of
the investment patterns of United States industries in
foreign countries. In this table, the focus is on the re-
lationship between United States exports and the sales of
United States subsidiaries located abroad. For this purpose,
the sales of United States subsidiaries have been adjusted
to exclude sales to the United States by United States
subsidiaries abroad. The figures in the table, therefore.
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Tnble 7
Plant & Equipment Expenditures, Investment Expenditures
i SLates and Fore:
States Industrie:
and Sales in the United eign Countries by United
a
Ratio of 4
research in-
tensive in-
4 research 14 dustries to
intensive other 14 other
industries industri ;s industries
(billions of dollars) (per cent)
Plant and equipment ox-
penditures 195b-64
In U. S.
In Europe, by U.S. owned
subsidiaries
In non-Europe, by U.S.
owned subsidiaries
cDirect investment, 1964
In U. S.
In U.S. owned subsidiaries
in Europe
In U.S. owned subsidiaries
in non-Europe
Sales, 1964
In U. S.
By U.S. owned subsidiaries
in Europe
By U.S. owned subsidiaries
in non-Europe
$32.7
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begin to approach a comparison between United States exports
and foreign sales which could conceivably be (but need not
necessarily be) export-substituting from the United States
viewpoint.
Once again, some familiar patterns emerge. In the European
area, the sales of United States subsidiaries are more impor-
tant in relation to United States exports than in the non-
European areas; if subsidiary sales are a substitute for
United States exports, then the process would seem to have
gone further in Europe than elsewhere. The tendency for
Europe to have a higher ratio of subsidiary sales to exports
than non-Europe is true both for the research-intensive and
the other industries, but the research-intensive industries
exhibit the tendency to a somewhat more marked degree. All
this is consistent with expectations. Where scale factors
are important, large markets are more likely to stimulate the
ultimate commitment of a production facility than small
markets.
The one new morsel of information which the table af-
fords is an indication of the extent to which the "other"
Indus tries of the United States have moved their overseas
operations from the sphere of exports to that of sales through
overseas subsidiaries. In these industries, as we have re-
peatedly observed, neither exports nor overseas investment have
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much prominence, at least when "normalized" by the level of
activities of those industries in the United States. How-
ever, of the two externally directed activities, exports and
foreign subsidiary sales, the export position appears even less
prominent than the subsidiary sales position. In terms of
Table 8, the ratio of subsidiary sales to export;- is fairly
high.
There are at least two observations worth making concerning
the high ratios of subsidiary sales to exports in these
"other industries. " One fits well enough into the theme of
this article; the other opens wholly new avenues of inquiry.
The observation that fits fairly well has to do with
the present export position of these "other" industries.
Time was, some decades ago, when the United States v;as a
heavy exporter of most of the materials included in "other
industries"
—
paper, food, rubber and metal products, in par-
ticular. In the course of time, the initial trade advan-
tage of United States industries in these products was
eroded. In partial response, those industries set up over-
seas subsidiaries to service their erstwhile export markets.
The subsidiaries did not always do precisely what their
parents had done by way of exports; while the subsidiaries
of the rubber companies may have taken over the tire markets
once serviced by their parents' exports, the subsidiaries of
the food companies no doubt engaged in many new activities
which could not have been supported by way of exports. In

36.
any event, in the end, subsidiary sales were a means by v/hich
contact with foreign markets was maintained.
But there is obviously another phenomenon involved.
United States firms such as those in food distribution and
food processing are commonly found investing in foreign mar-
kets for reasons which have little to do with sa''vaging an
export position. Some of these firms, in effect, are seeking
to sell a technique of production, finance, marketing or
general organization, this is certainly the interpretation
to be placed on such investments as those of Libby, McNeill
& Libby and General Foods in Europe. It is not sufficient,
therefore, to explain United States overseas investment with
a simple set of hypotheses based on the protection of mar-
kets previously acquired.
As a more complete explanation is developed of the
forces behind United States overseas investment, the issue of
market defense and market protection will no doubt play a
part. But the strengths that derive from research and from
the capacity to organize and maintain large complex organi-
zations will surely figure in some independent sense as
well.
Further research on the functioning of research and
development in the creation of new products, new processes
and new systems, and on the forces that lead to industrial
concentration and large scale operations will be particularly
fruitful in shedding more light on the problems that have been
only partially answered in this paper.
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Statistical Appendix
Tables 1 & 2 *
1. Research and development: I;.dustry research and develop-
ment expenditures in 1962 from NSF 65-18, Basic Research ,
Applied Research, and Development in Industry, 1962
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965),
p. 95 for total research and developmont and p. 105 for
company-financad research and development. The National
Science Foundation divides these figures by he sales of
the responding firms that do research and development
in order to get a ratio of research and development ex-
penditures as a percentage of sales. This seemed to be
inadequate for our purpose of developing an index of
research intensity for an industry as it omitted the
sales of the firms that do not do research and develop-
ment. We divided by total industrial sales as measured
by the FTC-SBC Quarterly Financial Reports . NSF lumped
some industries together [22 + 23; 24 + 25r 21, 27 +
31] . We estimated industry inputs by disaggregating the
NSF data by the ratios of scientists and engineers in
these industries as reported in U.S. Bureau of the
Census, U.S. Census of Population; 1960 Subject Reports
Occupation by Industry , Final Report PC (2) - 7C
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1962), Table 2. It is unlikely that errors resulting
from this method of estimation would affect the findings
because of the very small amounts of research and develop-
ment to be allocated in these seven industries. In this
case a little bit more or less of a very small amount
will cause insignificant errors.
2. Scientists and Engineers in Research and Development in
1962 from B.L.S. Bulletin No. 1418, Employment of Scien-
tific and Technical Personnel in Industry, 1962
(Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1964), p. 35. Employment by industry taken from B.L.S.
,
Er^ployment and Earnings Statistics for the United
States 1909-64 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1965).
3. Exports and imports from OECD Statistical Bulletins;
Foreign Trade Scries B, Analytical Abstracts Jan. - Dec.
1962, (Paris; OECD, 1963), numbers 1 and 5.
Where data is used again in subsequent tables, it is
not referenced. For example, scientists and engineers as a
percentage of total employment is a variable used in Tables
3 and 5 as well as in Tables 1 and 2.
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Tables 3 & 5
1. World exports of U.S. and all OECD countries—see A-3
above, numbers 1-6. Japan was not included in the
OECD until after 1962, and her world exports taken
from U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
Trade Statistics According to SITC , Series D. Vol.
XII, Number 1-20. Jan. -Dec. 1962. In order to be
able to perform parametric tests, a range of values
from 0.2 to 5.0 was set. For example, a positive
value divided by zero would give a measure l : absolute
advantage equal to 5.0. Similarly, a zero divided
by a positive number would be given a value of ab-
solute disadvantage of 0.2. The conversion from SITC
to SIC was done according to the following:
SIC SITC
Food and beverage
Tobacco
Textiles
Apparel
Lumber & wood products
Furniture
Paper & allied products
Printing
Chemicals
Drugs
All other chemicals
Petroleum products
Rubber and plastic
products
Leather
Stone, clay & glass
Primary metals
Iron and steel
Non-ferrous metals
Fabricated metals
Machinery other than
electric
Electric machinery
Transportation equipment
Aircraft
All other transport
Scientific instruments
20
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Table 6
1. The percentage of cory^anies indicating majority of
research and davalopment efforts for n-'iw products from
the 1958 McGraw-Hill Survey of Capital Spending.
2. Sci-^ntists and cngin;.'ers in production and in sales as
a percentage of total industry employment in 1962 from
B.L.S. Bulletin No. 1418, op. cit . , p. 35.
3. Index of employment concentration: The Conference
Board Record (April 1964), p. 52.
4. Index of asset scale, 1961 and index of sales scale,
1961: U.S. Treasury Dept. Internal Revenue Service,
Statistics of Income 1961-62: Corporate Income Tax
R'5 turns . Table 2.
5. Cost characteristics: U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Census of Manufactures, 1958 , Vol. 1, Summary
Statistics, Tabls 3.
Table 7
1. Plant and equipment expenditures from 1958-64 in the
U.S.: Survey of Current Business ,: July 1961, p. 29,
and September 1^65, p. 6. Plant and equipment expen-
ditures of U.S. corporations in Europe and non-Europe:
Survey of Currant Business , October 1960, p. 20;
September 1961, p. 21; and September 1965, p. 29.
2. Direct investment in the U.S. in 1964: FTC-SEC,
Q-aarterly Financial Rc^ports , First Quarter, 1965. For
U.S. owned subsidiaries in lliurope and non-Europe:
Survey of Current Business ; September 1965, Table 5,
p. C7.
3. For sales in thr; U.S. in 1964: FTC-SEC, Quarterly
Financial R' po^ts . First Quarter, 1965. For sales of
U.S. owned subsidiaries in Europe and non-Europe:
Survey of C.irrent Business : November 1965, p. 19.
Table 8
See sources for Table 7.
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Major limitations of th«s data
The following weaknesses of the data should be consiclered
when the findings presented in the paper are evaluated: (1)
The conversion of activity from SITC to SIC is only approxi-
mate in some cases; (2) the definition of R & D as used by
companies in NSF reports differs between firms and industries;
(3) the SIC 2-digit level aggregates dissimilar industries;
(4) research and development data is gathered at the company
level and this distorts the inputs by industry for diversifiv«d
firms; (5) there is often not a complete matchii of industry
classification for various measures of activity ^e.g. scale
data is by company while employment data is by establishment,
etc.); (6) some goods should not be expected to move in
international activity (e.g. newspapers) and this lowers the
ratio of trade performance to sales; (7) trade with Canada
may not be a result of th<!! forces under examination, but may
result from the partial integration of the two economies;
(8) activities related to natural resources have, in general,
not been eliminated; (9) other forces such as the differen-
tial impact of the "Buy American" provision of U.S. foreign
aid have not been considered; (10) indirect exports have
not been evaluated (e.g. shipments of instrumentation from
SIC 36 that enter into airplanes that are exported by
SIC 37) .
None of these limitations would affect the ordinal
division of manufacturing activity into the five most re-
search-intensive industries and the fourteen less research-
intensive industries. There still would be a substantial
gap between the fifth and sixth industries in order of re-
search intensity.
These weaknesses, together with the arbitrary definition
of the industries and the differences in the size of in-
dustries, have led us to use the methodology of dividing
manufacturing activity into five research-intensive and
fourteen less research-intensive industries. The summation
of manufacturing activity into two classes of activity helps
to make manifest the differences that exist between the
research-intensive and the less research-intensive. This
measure is less subject to the enumerated statistical
weaknesses and is in harmony with the measures of Spearman
rank correlation that were given. But it does not permit
a disregard for the very substantial limitations that are
inherent in the data.
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